I am a postdoc in Economics at NYU Abu Dhabi. My research interests lie within behavioral and experimental economics and the economics of networks.
In my job market paper, I study how group identities can promote social coordination when minority groups strategically match their identity with that of the dominant majority to escape segregation (see JM paper)
I am on the 2019/2020 economics job market and available for interviews at the EEA (Rotterdam) and the ASSA (San Diego) job market meetings.
Download my CV (here)
Abstract: In this paper I study how identities impact efficiency in social coordination settings. I formalize a game theoretic model and then test the main insights from the model in a laboratory experiment. The findings show there is a tension between choosing efficiently and choosing consistently with one’s identity. While efficiency is achieved when all players integrate and choose one same action to coordinate on, identities cause agents to have opposing views on which action is best to adopt, driving them towards a segregated society. Arguably, a way to solve this problem is to facilitate agents in minority groups to assimilate by strategically match their identity to that of the majority. I test this conjecture, looking at different challenges to assimilation as treatment variations, and find support for this prediction: when identities are rigid inefficient segregation is predominant, but flexible identities can solve this conflict and promote efficiency via assimilation.